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Abstract 
While existing research recognizes the central importance of social identities in 
motivating participation in social movements, much less is known about the creation of 
such groups. In this paper we take a social identity perspective and consider the ways that 
both “nice” (prosocial) and “nasty” (hostile) social movements can be mobilized through 
the dynamic construction of social identities. We argue that group interaction plays a key 
role as the medium through which social movements actively construct and negotiate the 
content the group membership. This intra-group interaction can result in consensual 
norms for social action. We argue that by harnessing the power of this identity formation 
process, one can practically utilize collectives as instruments for positive social change. 
Conversely, awareness of these processes can also be used to subvert the formation of 
hostile movements. We thus use our theoretical platform as a basis for suggested 
interventions. 
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Nice and Nasty: The Formation of Prosocial and Hostile Social Movements 
We might expect that those who wish to create social movements in favour of 
intervention might do so […] by […] constructing norms in such a way that 
humanitarian action is a central tenant of the group…The implication is that… 
helping is something that can be actively created through argument. It is 
something that can be publicly mobilized (Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins 
and Levine, 2006, p. 53, emphasis added). 
Social identities are central constructs in motivating participation in social 
movements. A wealth of research supports the contention that people will engage in 
organized, collective forms of action when they identify with relevant groups (Haslam, 
2001; Klandermans, 1997, 2002; Reicher, 1984, 1987; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 
2008a). However, not all social groups are equally associated with action (McGarty, 
Bliuc, Thomas & Bongiorno, 2009; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008a). 
Recent research suggests that it is those identities that have become politicized that are 
the more proximal predictors of participation in collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 
2001), however what are less well understood are the processes by which such social 
identities are formed. Although social identity research has obvious practical potential, in 
order to realize this potential we need to understand how social identities are formed and 
transformed towards collective expressions of action.  
In this paper we seek to bridge this gap by elaborating the ways that both 
prosocial and hostile social movements are mobilised through the dynamic construction 
of social identities. More specifically, we explore how debates within social movements 
negotiate the content of the group membership, and how this process can result in 
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consensual norms for social action. We argue that by harnessing the power of this 
identity formation process, one can practically utilize collectives as instruments for 
positive social change. Conversely, awareness of these processes can also be used to stop 
hostile forms of group behaviour from occurring. To this end, we use our theoretical 
platform as a basis for suggested interventions. However, before it is possible to discuss 
these propositions in more detail, it is first necessary to provide some working 
definitions, and describe the key tenets of the social identity perspective (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; J.C Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987).  
The Social Identity Perspective 
Traditional theorising on crowd behaviour sees it as the result of a loss of 
individuality as people succumb to an irrational “group mind” (Le Bon, 1895 / 1947). On 
the other hand, the social identity approach emphasises the profound psychological 
reality of social groups and collective behaviour (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 
1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). The social identity perspective (an 
epithet which captures the joint predictions of social identity theory [SIT] and self-
categorization theory [SCT]) argues that such group behaviour is the outcome of a shift 
from personal to social identity (Reicher, 1987), but where social identities constitute an 
equally valid and important part of the self-concept (Onorato & J.C. Turner, 2004). Thus, 
from this perspective, social movement participation is a reflection of a psychologically 
meaningful social identity. Consistent with this perspective, and following R.H. Turner 
and Killian (1987, p.223) we define a social movement as: ‘A collectivity acting with 
some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or organisation of which it is 
part.’ A crowd event (such as those studied by Le Bon) could be seen as one instantiation 
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of a broader social movement organization. For our purposes, there are two main reasons 
why social identities are important in explaining social movements. The first is that social 
identities make group behaviour possible (Turner et al., 1987). A social identity acts as a 
conceptual and psychological “link” between the individual and the group, and thus 
enables co-action of groups in line with shared understanding of who “we” are. The 
importance of this shared understanding and agreement, or consensus, amongst group 
members is a point we will return to later. The second reason, related to the first, is that 
when a social identity is salient (and becomes meaningful in a given context), group 
members will behave in line with the group norms which describe how group members 
ought to think, feel and behave. The more people think the group in question is important 
and self-defining for them, the more likely they will be to act in line with the norms, 
values and beliefs that define the group (Terry & Hogg, 1996). Thus, social identities 
shape individual behaviour not because of conformity to external pressures; they shape 
behaviour because they become internalized aspects of “self”, and because their 
normative dimensions shape our perceptions of what is right and proper and thus our 
expectations of others’ views and behaviour. Consistent with these points, we argue that 
similar processes underpin the formation of identities that are commonly seen as either 
prosocial (those that promote inter-group cooperation, social harmony and / or social 
equality) or hostile (those that promote inter-group aggression, prejudice or hostility; 
Reicher, Haslam & Rath, 2008).  
Despite the evidence suggesting the significant role of social identities in 
understanding social movements’ actions (Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996), what is less well 
understood is the ways that they are formed and transformed. That is, we understand 
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much less about how to actively create such groups. In this paper we elaborate on the 
ways that both “nice” and “nasty” social movements can be mobilized through the 
dynamic construction of social identities. We argue that interaction plays a key role, as 
the medium through which social ideologies may be aired and socially validated. 
Through interaction, privately-held views can become a statement of ingroup identity 
content: A manifesto of “who we are” and “how we should act”. And it is through this 
process of interaction, communication and debate, that social movements mobilise people 
towards “prosocial” as well as “hostile” actions. We define prosocial actions as those that 
are geared to achieving positive outcomes that are nonexclusive and generically 
prosocial, for example, actions to alleviate poverty and preventable disease amongst 
people in developing countries. On the other hand, we define hostile actions as those 
which exclusively benefit one group at the expense of, and sometimes with the willing 
exclusion or abuse of, one or more other groups in society (i.e., inter-group hostility). 
While we draw on concepts of inclusion and equality in deploying our definitions of 
“prosocial” and “hostile” we readily acknowledge that these terms are themselves the 
sites of controversy and contestation (see Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, the implication is that, by moulding and guiding social interaction, it may 
be possible to both: a) promote prosocial social movements; and b) undermine those 
inclined towards hostility. Our practical recommendations draw explicitly on this 
possibility.  
Accordingly, we ask the questions: How is commitment to social movements 
shaped? In the case of social movements which have prosocial goals as their aim, what 
are the processes that facilitate the formation of social identities to inspire sustained 
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commitment to the cause? Conversely, in the case of social movements that promote 
hostility and conflict, what are the processes which underline the formation of such 
groups, and how can we subvert these (noting that the promotion of conflict may at times 
be a reasonable response to unreasonable circumstances)? Our focus in exploring these 
questions will be on the practical, and strategic, implications of such processes for 
practitioners of seeking to effect social change or reduce inter-group hostility.  
To begin, we will propose a single framework for understanding the dynamic 
construction of social identities which engender support for social movements. Our focus 
here is on exploring the role of communication, debate and consensualization in 
(im)mobilizing social movements. We suggest that it is this dynamic, iterative process 
that underpins the formation of, and participation in, social movements (broadly defined, 
R.H Turner & Killian, 1987). The quote from Reicher et al. (2006) at the start of this 
paper anticipates our focus nicely: Helping and hostility are behaviours that can be 
created through argument and dialogue. Having outlined our general framework for 
exploring the formation of “nice” and “nasty” social movements, we will then discuss 
research which directly shows how the process of consensualizing around support for 
prosocial or hostile social movements can shift people’s commitment to act in line with 
those movements. On the basis of this evidence, a series of practical recommendations 
will be made for promoting or subverting the formation of such movements.  
Group Interaction and Identity Formation 
Lewin (1947) provided social psychology with seminal early insights into the 
power of group decision to influence individual attitudes and behaviour. In particular, 
Lewin’s (1947) research on food preferences in the context of World War II showed that 
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enduring behavioural change was more likely to occur as a consequence of participating 
in group discussion than attendance at a lecture on the same topic. Subsequent research 
on the group polarization phenomenon (Myers & Lamm, 1976; Moscovici, 1991; see 
Turner, 1991, for a review) also illuminated the powerful role of the group as a polarizer 
of (positive and negative) social attitudes and behaviours.  
More recent theorizing suggests that the transformative effects of group 
interaction evidenced in both Lewin’s work and the group polarization phenomenon can 
be understood as a process of identity formation. In particular, work on the interactive 
model of identity formation (IMIF), as well as work on the opinion-based group 
interaction method (OBGIM) demonstrates that these processes lead to the formation of 
psychologically meaningful groups. It is to a brief review of this work that we now turn. 
Our goal in this review is to provide a theoretical framework for understanding how 
social identities can be geared to positive or hostile social action. 
The Interactive Model of Identity Formation 
 Postmes and colleagues’ interactive model of identity formation (IMIF) provides 
one framework for understanding the dynamic formation of social identities (Postmes, 
Haslam & Swaab, 2005a; Postmes, Spears, Lee & Novak, 2005b). The IMIF suggests 
that social identities can be generated through two separate (but interconnected) routes. 
There is a deductive route, whereby the identity and associated norms are deduced from 
social-structural information about inter-group relations, group history, and invariant 
features at the group level such as physical features. There is also an inductive route, 
whereby the members of the group infer, or develop, norms through a process of 
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observation, intra-group communication, negotiation and consensualization about what it 
means to be an ingroup member. 
Central to the inductive process is the role of communication, negotiation and 
consensualization in forming these social identities; indeed, this model arguably 
constitutes the most explicit statement of the role of these processes in social identity 
formation (cf. Tajfel, 1974). The process of reaching a shared understanding or 
agreement is one of consensualization around group norms, where the consensus process 
is the process of transforming individual, or idiosyncratic, views, to a socially shared 
representation of reality (Haslam et al., 1997). Indeed, Postmes, Haslam and Spears 
(2005, p.14) argue that “Consensualization is not merely about defining who “we” are, 
but about defining a social identity which guides action, and in that sense helps us decide 
and realise who we want to be…” Thus, consensus powerfully contributes to the 
development of a shared sense of “we”; but it is also an outcome of the identity formation 
process, such that group members expect to agree with other group members. On the 
other hand, when consensus breaks down, or cannot be achieved, the group and its 
associated norms that prescribe thought and action lose their impact because they are no 
longer an uncontested and unchallenged compass for group behaviour (Prentice & Miller, 
1993). 
What is the evidence that these ideas apply to the formation of “nice” and “nasty” 
social groups? Evidence for the idea that social movements are formed through a 
dynamic process of negotiation and consensualization around norms for social action 
comes, among others, from research in the context of research on: the social identity 
model of deindividuation effects (SIDE; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995); the 
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elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000); and 
the dynamics of leadership (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine & Rath, 2008). It is to a brief 
review of this work that we now turn.  
The idea that group norms can explain collective action, and that these are formed 
in fluid and iterative ways, is a key assumption of the social identity model of 
deindividuation effects (SIDE; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). This model focuses 
on the cognitive and strategic factors involved in identity definition and enactment. 
According to SIDE, individuals within crowds act in normative and controlled ways, 
specific to the social identity of the crowd (see Drury & Reicher, 2000). Rather than 
experiencing a “loss of self” (as Le Bon proposed), the uniformity of crowd behaviour is 
the result of a cognitive re-categorization in terms of a common social identity with the 
crowd (a cognitive process). Furthermore, SIDE also suggests that there is a strategic 
process by which individuals use their identities as a resource to promote or resist 
change. 
SIDE research has tended to use computer mediated communication (CMC) to 
explore these key predictions, and has shown inter alia that social interaction in 
anonymous groups can produce changes in social identity content (e.g. Postmes, Spears 
& Lea, 2000; Postmes, Spears, & Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001; Sassenberg & Postmes, 
2002). CMC has also been shown to engender perceptions of social support, which 
promotes participation in social action (Spears, Lea, Corneliussen, Postmes & Ter Haar, 
2002). Thus, SIDE research has increasingly acknowledged the relevance of intra-group 
processes in the dynamic formation of social identities which facilitate social action. 
A similar shift to considering the development of social identity content through 
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inter-group interaction can be seen in the formulation of the elaborated social identity 
model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005; following Reicher, 
1996). ESIM explores the ways that crowd action can be understood as an outcome of 
dynamic, changing relations between groups (e.g. protesters and police). ESIM argues 
that by analysing crowd events as developing interactions, one can account for both 
social determination and social change in collective action. For example, Drury and 
Reicher (2000) argued that an unexpected inter-group dynamic can emerge if crowd 
members hold a different understanding of their social position to that held by an 
outgroup (e.g., the police). This new inter-group dynamic can then affect the identity 
content of crowd members. Although the focus of ESIM is primarily on the interactions 
between groups, it nevertheless acknowledges the crucial role of within-group processes 
in the interpretation of inter-group dynamics, and in the process of transforming the 
social identity of the crowd and gearing it toward particular forms of action. Thus, in 
ESIM interaction is crucial for change to occur; and social identity content is dynamic 
and dependent upon social interaction (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984). 
Importantly, the perceived legitimacy of certain actions is a fluid part of this process. 
Consistent with both SIDE and the ESIM, the work of Reicher and colleagues has 
shown the ways that leaders can profoundly shape the formation of positive (Reicher et 
al., 2006) and negative (Reicher et al., 2008) social behaviours. For example, Reicher et 
al. (2006) analysed public documents used to mobilize Bulgarians against the deportation 
of Jews during World War II. Their social identity model of helping and solidarity 
outlined the ways that Bulgarian leaders represented identity concerns such that: a) the 
Jews were treated as part of a common Bulgarian national ingroup; b) the category norms 
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for the Bulgarian identity prescribed support for a persecuted people; c) the Bulgarian 
ingroup would be threatened by not helping. Thus, Reicher et al. (following Billig, 1985, 
1996; Edwards, 1991; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) argue that category inclusiveness (a), 
group norms (b), and category interests (c) can be strategically deployed by those seeking 
to shape a social movement defined by helping and solidarity.  
On the other hand, Reicher and colleagues have documented the ways that similar 
processes underpin the formation of extreme negative social behaviours (i.e. genocide, 
Reicher et al., 2008; Reicher et al., 2005b). Reicher et al.’s five step model of the 
development of collective hate argues that the horrific events of the Holocaust can also be 
understood as an outcome of the ways in which category boundaries, ingroup interests 
and concerns (particularly as they relate to ingroup virtue and morality) were constructed 
by influential group leaders. Reicher, Haslam et al. (2008, p.1338) argue that, while each 
of these steps may be harmless in isolation, “like the elements of a chemical reaction… 
may be explosive in combination”. A full discussion of these arguments is beyond the 
scope of the current paper, but note that this research contributes to the other research 
described above by exploring the powerful ways in which leadership processes impact on 
followers to shape positive and negative social behaviours (Reicher et al., 2005a).  
Our focus in this paper is on the ways that group members actively create 
meaning out of the social context and construct their identities in the bottom-up fashion 
described by the IMIF. As is evident from the work discussed above, group members do 
not only attend to the sorts of category constructions that leaders promote (as in the work 
of Reicher and colleagues); they also engage in discussion and debate amongst 
themselves about what it means to be a member of the group. The IMIF provides an 
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explicit account of how individuals construct social identities through a process of group 
discussion, debate and consensualization. Indeed, Postmes, Spears et al. (2005, p.749) 
have suggested that inductive identity formation holds the key to social change, stating 
that:  
It is through this process of induction that the individual actions of group 
members (whether they be ordinary group members, powerful individuals, or 
leaders) can shape group identity, and it is partly through this process that social 
change becomes possible [emphasis added]. 
Thus, the work of Postmes and colleagues has been particularly concerned with 
elaborating the ways in which individuals can come together to form a shared 
representation of social reality (i.e. a social identity; Postmes et al., 2000; Postmes et al., 
2005b; Postmes et al., 2001). In this paper we focus on the inductive processes of small 
group communication and consensualization, in the formation of groups defined by 
“nice” and “nasty” social action.  
Overview 
Thus far we have outlined a framework for understanding the formation of groups 
which are defined by prosocial and hostile social action. Our review so far suggests that 
the dynamics of identity formation can be understood by exploring small group 
interaction. By bringing individuals together and allowing them to discuss, debate and 
consensualize upon group norms, this can shape the nature and meaning of the social 
identity. We argue that by observing the crystallization and transformation of such 
identities we begin to understand the formation of prosocial and hostile social 
movements. Indeed, we argue that the small group dynamics of intra-group interaction 
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can be understood as a microcosm – or Petri dish – of social change processes. It is to the 
more specific implications of intra-group interaction for promoting the formation of 
prosocial social movements; or subverting the formation of hostile ones, that we now 
turn.  
Prosocial Social Movements 
It is well documented that collective forms of protest are a relatively uncommon 
response to injustice (Hornsey et al., 2006; Klandermans, 2002): It is overcoming apathy 
that is the challenge when it comes to the formation of social movements defined by 
positive social action (Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009b).  However, given the 
importance of social movements in providing a forum for ordinary people to act on their 
justice concerns, and also as a vehicle of social change (Moyer, McAllister, Finley & 
Soifer, 2001), social psychology has long recognised the importance of considering the 
psychological conditions under which people will take action to overcome the inequality 
that they themselves, or others, experience. In this section we seek to highlight an 
important new method to help us understand the factors that facilitate, or undermine, 
commitment to positive action. This new method is premised on the ideas outlined above 
regarding the power of group interaction to subjectively transform individuals to take 
coordinated social action. In outlining this new method we also develop the theoretical 
picture of how consensual understandings lead to the formation of new social identities. 
Given these points, we first outline the opinion-based group interaction method, and will 
then discuss the existing research utilizing this method. We will use this review to make 
three practical recommendations for people seeking to effect positive social change 
through the formation of relevant, meaningful social groups.  
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The Opinion-based Group Interaction Method  
 Concurrent to the development of the IMIF, McGarty and colleagues (Gee et al., 
2007; Khalaf, 2002; McGarty et al., 2009; Thomas and McGarty, 2009) explicitly 
explored the ways that identities, which are defined by positive social change, can be 
allowed to develop through a process of small group interaction. The opinion based group 
interaction method (OBGIM) details a three-step method for observing, and exploring, 
the formation of positive social movements.  
In the first step participants sign on (self-categorize) as supporters of a particular 
movement, an opinion-based group membership. The cornerstone of OBGIM is the 
opinion-based group concept outlined by Bliuc, McGarty and colleagues (Bliuc et al., 
2007; McGarty et al., 2009). The opinion-based group concept is premised on the idea 
that shared opinions can be the basis for psychological group formation.  Where these 
opinions relate to support, or opposition to, a variety of social issues, and the social 
context elicits a sense of shared identity with other people who share that opinion (as per 
the principles outlined by SCT; Turner et al., 1987), it has the potential to lead to social 
action on behalf of that opinion-based group. McGarty and colleagues have argued that 
the opinion-based group concept might be a useful tool in understanding the dynamics of 
social cooperation (McGarty, 2006) and the development of participation in collective 
action (McGarty et al., 2009). Indeed, while much of the existing research has explored 
positive and negative social action as the outcomes of a sociological categories (e.g. 
gender; Tougas & Veilleux, 1988; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995), or politicized social 
movement identity (Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004), McGarty et al (2009) 
have recently argued that a group based on a shared opinion is more readily able to 
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capture the process of transformation from mere (individual) opinion, to group formation, 
to active social participation in support of a particular movement. Thus, the first step 
involves nominal self-categorization as a member of the particular pro-change opinion-
based group. In our previous research we have explored groups based on opinions about 
reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in Australia, poverty 
reduction (anti-poverty) in developing countries, and environmental behaviour. 
In the second step, participants engage in a small group planning session, where 
they are asked to develop, and reach agreement upon, ways to promote the movement 
they just signed on to. It is argued that, when (nominal) supporters of an opinion come 
together and collectively devise strategies to advance their cause, this allows group 
members to engage in a process of communication and consensualization around new 
norms for social action. That is, through participation in the group planning session, 
group members are actually developing and crystallizing norms for social action 
(McGarty et al., 2009; see also Postmes et al., 2005a). Thus, this second step is 
conceptualized as a means of sharpening opinion-based group identification, but also acts 
to qualitatively transform the meaning of the group (such that “we” are a group that takes 
prosocial action). It is in this second step that identity formation and transformation takes 
place. We believe the psychological processes here are very closely related to the 
processes of consensualization that Haslam and colleagues discussed in relation to 
stereotype consensus (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Reynolds, 1997; Haslam et al., 
1998; Postmes, Haslam et al., 2005). The key difference though is that the focus here is 
on preparing for socio-political action to produce social change rather than on developing 
a potentially hostile view of some rival social group. This distinction is more apparent 
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than actual, however, when we note that these collectively derived stereotypes were 
conceived by Haslam and colleagues as tools to both represent and change social reality. 
This idea harmonises neatly with our overall contention that very similar group processes 
are involved in both hostile and prosocial action. 
In a third and final step, the experimenters take measures of identification with the 
relevant opinion-based group, commitment to take (positive) social action, and other 
action-relevant constructs (group emotions, collective efficacy beliefs, modern racism, 
authoritarianism). Thus, as with inductive identity formation, OBGIM is premised on the 
idea that communication and consensualization can promote group norms for positive 
social action (Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009a).  
From this research, the key findings can be summarized in the following two 
points. Note that we are discussing here the evidence for when consensualization and 
communication successfully transformed individuals into a (more) committed collective. 
We also have indirect evidence about when the method will fail; these “failures” are 
central to the practical lessons of this paper and will also be discussed (see Message 1 
below).  
1. “Successful” OBGIM Boosts Commitment to Act.  
Thomas and McGarty (2009; see also Thomas et al., 2009a) showed that 
participation in the small group planning session boosted commitment to anti-poverty 
action. That is, those who had been given the chance to discuss and consensualize upon 
norms for action, were subsequently more committed to taking anti-poverty action, 
compared to those who read equivalent information about inequality without engaging in 
group discussion (Thomas & McGarty, 2009) or participated in the planning task 
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individually (Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2010). Blink (2005) has shown similar 
positive effects in the context of support for reconciliation between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians, and also observed a reduction in modern racism.  
Research by Thomas and McGarty (2009) also provides some extra lessons for 
people seeking to boost commitment to social change through dialogue and debate. 
Building on the work of van Zomeren and colleagues (van Zomeren et al., 2004; van 
Zomeren et al., 2008a; van Zomeren et al., 2008b) who have emphasized the role of 
group emotion and collective efficacy as key motivators of social action, Thomas and 
colleagues (Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009a) showed that invoking an 
outrage norm in OBGIM significantly boosted commitment to act, over and above that of 
standard OBGIM. Drawing on the account of norm formation and consensualization 
through group interaction outlined above, Thomas and colleagues reasoned that where 
group members can discuss and consensualize on an emotion norm, this should actively 
shape the nature of the emergent social group (see Thomas et al., 2009a, b). Thus, they 
invoked an outrage norm by making it a communication goal for the small group 
planning session. Consistent with these arguments, it was shown that outrage-norm 
OBGIM significantly boosted identification with the group and intention to take anti-
poverty action.  
To explore the effects of group interaction on concrete immediate behaviours, 
Thomas et al. (2010) provided participants with the opportunity to privately select flyers 
to distribute on behalf of the anti-poverty cause. Consistent with the increased 
commitment to the cause on the action intention scales, it was shown that participation in 
the group planning session did indeed translate to concrete supportive behaviours. That 
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is, those that had participated in group interaction were significantly more likely to take 
flyers to distribute on behalf of the cause.  
2. OBGIM Boosts Identification with Pro-change Groups.  
The effect of group interaction to boost commitment to act is mediated by 
increases in identification with the opinion-based group (Thomas et al., 2010). Thus, 
consistent with our arguments above, the process of discussing and reaching agreement 
on strategies to advance a positive social cause, significantly boosted identification with 
pro-change social groups. McGarty and colleagues (McGarty et al., 2009) have elsewhere 
argued that positive social action can be seen as the material outcome of opinion-based 
group membership. Given that one of the key determinants of social identity salience is 
social identification (Turner et al., 1987), it follows that any intervention that increases 
identification with such groups is likely to render such pro-change groups more 
psychologically prominent than previously. That is, increasing identification with pro-
change groups makes subsequent action more likely.   
Practical Recommendations for the Facilitation of Prosocial Social Movements 
Overall, then, drawing on research conducted in the context of OBGIM, as well as 
other social psychological insights into the processes underpinning commitment to 
positive social action (e.g. Drury et al., 2005; Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005; van Zomeren 
et al., 2008a; van Zomeren et al., 2008b; van Zomeren et al., 2004) we offer the following 
three recommendations for people seeking to bolster commitment to positive social 
change; those people Reicher, Haslam and colleagues call agents of change.   
Message 1: Create Opportunities for Group Members to Come to Consensual 
Understandings Around Norms for Prosocial Action.  
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Stemming from our review of inductive identity formation and the OBGIM 
method above, our first recommendation hinges on the critical importance of creating 
consensual understandings for prosocial action amongst group members. Our research 
reviewed above has shown that bringing group members together to engage in discussion 
and debate about what it means to be a supporter of the cause (specifically relating to 
normative actions), can provide one mechanism of creating this consensus (Thomas & 
McGarty, 2009). Through interaction privately held attitudes and beliefs are aired in a 
social arena, and group members actively construct and negotiate a shared sense of “we” 
in relation to pressing social issues.  
On the other hand, where the OBGIM method has failed to produce a shift in 
commitment to action, there is good evidence that this was, at least in part, because 
consensus had been undermined. Thomas et al. (2010; see also 2009a) showed that where 
efficacy beliefs were removed this undermined the usual effects on commitment to action 
brought about by OBGIM. Thomas et al. argued that it is likely that, as well as 
undermining efficacy beliefs which are themselves important in motivating commitment 
to act (Bandura, 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004), the lack of efficacy also undermined 
the groups’ ability to form a consensus around productive forms of action. That is, where 
group members cannot agree on the stability of the inequality, or indeed prospects for 
change, it is unlikely that they will reach agreement on productive forms of social action. 
Overall then, as intimated by Lewin’s (1947) seminal studies: people seeking to 
bolster commitment to positive social change would do well to engage would-be 
supporters in discussion (either face-to-face or computer mediated; see Brunsting & 
Postmes, 2002) with other like-minded people, rather than simply provide them with 
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information. Indeed, it seems that many agents of change are already aware of the 
powerful effects of dialogue; one website goes so far as to claim that it is through internet 
blogging that social change can become a reality (http://thelpproject.blogspot.com/). 
People seeking to effect positive social change may also consider other methods of 
establishing consensual understandings amongst group members in the absence of group 
interaction. For example, it may be possible to imply intra-group consensus by having 
supporters watch video taped discussions on social issues (as implied by the research of 
Mackie, 1986; see also Bennett Pelz, 1958).     
Message 2: Attend to, and Actively Shape, Consensual Understandings in Relation to 
Emotion and Beliefs 
The research of Thomas et al. (2009b) has pointed to the significant prospects for 
normative emotion and efficacy beliefs in mobilizing and demobilizing potential 
supporters. Emotions in particular are capable of conveying a large amount of 
information, rapidly, to shape group memberships and coordinate productive social action 
(Peters & Kashima, 2007). Our own research has shown that deploying an emotion norm, 
by making it a communication goal of a small group interaction, has had powerful effects 
on commitment to action and concrete actions. Elsewhere we have explored the 
possibility that, where outrage and efficacy become encapsulated in the context of a 
salient identity, it is this politicized identity which may be most equipped to take action 
(the encapsulation model of social identity in collective action; Thomas et al., 2009a). 
Thus, agents of change would do well to consider ways of productively depicting group 
attributes relating to normative emotions and beliefs. Statements like: “Supporters of the 
Make Poverty History campaign find these actions outrageous” conveys much about the 
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physiological and phenomenological attributes of supporters. Furthermore, to the extent 
that this outrage becomes contextually, normatively embodied in “what it means” to be a 
supporter (see Message 1 regarding consensualization), this should act to make the 
identity more ready for action because it politicizes the identity (Simon & Klandermans, 
2001).    
We have argued that moral outrage is a particularly promising emotion in the 
international development context (Thomas et al., 2009b), but it seems likely that other 
emotions would be more fruitfully deployed in different contexts. For example, self-
focused anger (Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2006) may be deployed in contexts where the 
optimal strategy is on the behaviour change, and regulation, of the advantaged group (for 
example, prejudice reduction amongst advantaged group members). On the other hand, 
guilt may be a useful emotion where the strategic goal is apology or other more symbolic 
outcomes (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Iyer, Leach & 
Pedersen, 2004). Overall, given that campaign organisers often have well-developed 
plans for the sorts of social strategies they are seeking to effect (for example, 
volunteerism, charity or political action) they would do well to consider how these 
strategies might “fit” with different emotional reactions (as in Thomas et al., 2009b).  
As regards efficacy beliefs, it would seem that people who design advocacy 
campaigns are also skilled and intuitively savvy about the need for core efficacy beliefs. 
It is important that group members are informed of victories, however small, so that they 
know that change is possible. Consistent with this point, campaigns often provide 
supporters with feedback which details successes in the field (Thomas, 2005). However, 
this may need to be carefully executed. Some research (e.g. Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe 
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& Brehm, 2008) suggests that, where actions are too easy and efficacy beliefs are high, 
this can demobilize action-relevant emotions and potentially reduce action overall. Thus, 
a careful balance must be struck between making supporters believe that action is no 
longer required because all the problems are solved, and the belief that action will be 
pointless because the problems are intractable.  
Message 3: Empower Supporters by Providing Means for Legitimate Expressions of 
Social Identity Through Action 
The work of Drury, Reicher and colleagues have described the powerful 
subjective experience of psychological empowerment, brought about through 
participation in action. Drury and Reicher (2005; Drury et al., 2005) suggest that feelings 
of empowerment emerge when people actualize, or realize, their social identity against 
the power of dominant forces. That is, their actions upon the world reflect their identity 
and provide evidence that one is active and powerful.  
Empowerment is understood to be characterised by: the process of actualising the 
social identity (through taking action); a belief that one is active and powerful; and is 
accompanied by strong affective reactions (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Psychological 
empowerment has been argued to have personal (Drury et al., 2005) and lasting (Drury & 
Reicher, 2005) significance for action. Feelings of empowerment can arise simply from 
the display of one’s social identity in the face of dominant forces; more empowering still 
is the awareness that one’s group has gained ground on a powerful adversary. The 
implication is that giving people – even those only nominally committed to the cause – an 
opportunity to enact their identity, may be a useful way to move them up the 
“participatory chain” to take more committed forms of action.  
Nice and Nasty 
 24 
In this research Drury and Reicher have also emphasized the importance of the 
perceived legitimacy of particular forms of action, but have also shown the ways that 
these can change as the dynamics of the group evolve. Where actions are not seen as 
legitimate or meaningful expression of what the group is about and “who we are”, these 
will not be consensually supported by group members.  
Overall, the implication of this research is that an identity is not something that is 
“switched on”, which then leads to collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008a). Rather, 
it is formed over time, often in consultation with like-minded others. Importantly, group 
members are likely to discuss not only what they should do (action), but how they feel 
(emotion) and what they believe (efficacy beliefs). Failure to attend to the intra-group 
processes that shape positive social action will inevitably miss much of the complexity of 
understanding social movement formation. We believe that OBGIM contributes one 
important piece of the puzzle, which has implications for theory and practice alike. 
Hostile Social Movements 
 Although social movements can be vehicles of positive social change, they can 
also be forces of political hostility which dramatically increase social tensions and/or aim 
to harm outgroup members. For example, riots “against free speech” followed the 
publication in Denmark of cartoons satirizing the prophet Mohammed (BBC News 
online, 2006), stirring up inter-religious animosity. Slogans included, "Europe you will 
pay with your blood" and "7/7 on its way," (BBC news online, 2007). In fact, throughout 
history there are examples of hostile movements sweeping across countries, the medieval 
religion-inspired Crusades to name but one.  
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Much social psychological research has aimed to investigate the question of why 
a benevolent collection of individuals can turn into a murderous mass. Yet despite these 
advances in our understanding, social psychological laboratory research generally and 
social identity research in particular still struggles to satisfactorily explain hostile social 
behaviour (Billig, 2002; Brewer, 1999; Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). For example, 
the minimal group studies (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) robustly 
demonstrated the tendency for isolated individuals to display ingroup favouritism.  
However, research would seem to suggest that individuals in minimal groups are 
reluctant to administer negative outcomes, i.e., to punish the outgroup (the positive-
negative asymmetry effect, or PNAE; Mummendey et al., 1992; Struch & Schwartz, 
1989).  Indeed, the “punishment” of an outgroup has been shown to occur only when 
inter-group comparisons make it seem appropriate (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000). 
Consistent with this point, Smith and Postmes (2009) demonstrated that the PNAE could 
be attenuated through intra-group dialogue. In small groups, participants discussed 
appropriate ways in which to divide negative resources (i.e., fines) between ingroup and 
outgroup members. By forming a norm through interaction which legitimized outgroup 
punishment, participants were willing to discriminate against the outgroup. Smith and 
Postmes (2009) argued that the ingroup norm for inter-group behaviour changed as a 
function of the intra-group interaction.   
Thus, we suggest that each hostile social movement can have at its origin some 
consensual negotiation of its ideology which is perceived (from within the ingroup) to 
legitimize inter-group hostility. By focusing our attention on intra-group processes, we 
nevertheless acknowledge the important role of provocation at the inter-group level. 
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Indeed, research undertaken on the ESIM (described above) neatly captures the ways in 
which intra-group dynamics are always embedded in broader inter-group contexts of 
legitimacy and power. However, our focus here is on the ways that hostile social 
movements can be understood through the lens of inductively constructed social 
identities ( as described by the IMIF; Postmes, Haslam et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears et 
al., 2005). In Staub’s (1989) classic thesis on genocide and group violence, he observes 
that group members often willingly accept and elaborate genocidal group norms, goals, 
views and ideology: Leaders and followers are both active contributors – the very fact 
that participants are more than passive obedients makes such systematic and pervasive 
eradication of entire populations possible. This implies that the outgroup hostility that 
ensues is a choice, rather than the result of a mere loss of self, as forwarded by traditional 
deindividuation theory (e.g. Zimbardo, 1969). Therefore, it appears that rather than being 
disinhibited, hostile collective behaviour is oriented to the local norms of the ingroup. 
This concept underpins later theories of deindividuation (Postmes & Spears, 1998, p. 
238) and recent research into oppression (Postmes & Smith, 2009), which argues that it is 
important to consider how the motivations of the individual group members evolve in 
relation to the intra-group dynamic.   
Recently, Postmes and Smith (2009) found evidence to suggest that individual 
members of high status groups orientate themselves to local ingroup norms.  If these 
norms support oppression, group members may oppress members of a lower status 
outgroup, relatively independent of the level of threat experienced.  This highlights that 
there are intra-group motivations for hostile political action that may operate relatively 
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independently of inter-group factors.  The question remains, as in Staub’s analysis of 
genocide, of how these norms form in the first place.   
In an attempt to answer to this question, Smith and Postmes (in press) 
demonstrated that discussion of negative outgroup stereotypes can increase support for 
hostile policy towards the outgroup, mediated by perceptions of the ingroup norm for 
social behaviour and subjective social validation. Stott and Drury (2004) have also 
demonstrated that consensualization around outgroup stereotypes can feed preferences 
for social action.  Crucially however, Smith and Postmes (in press) found that a 
perception of consensus about the ingroup’s ideology was necessary for the formation of 
norms for action and concomitant identification with the other discussants.   
Therefore, this series of studies suggests that (a) intra-group interaction about 
outgroup stereotypes can increase hostile social action, (b) this is engendered via a 
process of shaping the ingroup norm, and (c) this is contingent on perceptions of ingroup 
consensus and the social validation it can provide.  Following these conclusions, it seems 
that any intervention to subvert the formation of insidious social norms needs to either (1) 
break down the consensus within the ingroup, or (2) promote the formation of more 
benign identity content.  It is to these practical recommendations that we now turn. First, 
having established that the perception of consensus is a powerful predictor of group-
based action, we now look to the question of why groups reach consensus, and how this 
can be avoided whilst retaining the salience of the group as a relevant entity.   
Practical Recommendations for the Demobilization of Hostile Social Movements 
The crucial factor uncovered by the research reviewed above, which we must 
remember in the formulation of practical recommendations, is that social consensus and 
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social validation are the motors of norm formation.  Thus, norms for social action cannot 
emerge if individuals do not feel validated or perceive a lack of consensus about 
legitimate intergroup action and intergroup stereotypes.  Therefore, an intervention could 
focus on the transmission of a less stereotypical impression of the outgroup, a norm for 
dissent rather than consensus, less pressure towards uniformity, and the development of a 
norm of peaceful rather than harmful action. In the section below, we propose three 
sequential methods of decreasing or neutralizing hostility directed towards outgroups.  
Using this as a foundation, we then build a series of practical recommendations for the 
demobilization of hostile social movements. 
Issues to Consider when Designing Interventions for Hostile Movements 
Before discussing these practical recommendations, let us note that there are 
several issues which are unique to this question of intervening in hostile action.  
Individuals who participate in such groups inevitably see their aims and actions as 
positive and, if not absolutely justifiable, then certainly necessary for some greater good. 
Therefore, it is likely that they would not want to actively engage in an intervention 
unless coerced.  However, it would be important to minimise participants’ perception of 
coercion in the scheme by encouraging free and honest participation and expression of 
diverse viewpoints. This would simultaneously support the goal for active debate, and the 
intervention could be framed in this way.  
A second reason why the demobilization of hostile movements is complicated is 
that rather than strengthening commitment to a cause, intervention for negative action 
requires inverting or neutralizing the (externally-perceived) negative “valence” of the 
ingroup’s identity.  An entrenched ideology, such as that used by terrorists to justify 
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murder, may be difficult to change.  However, encouraging a norm of nuanced argument, 
with a goal of intra-group dissent, may to some extent disable the group’s willingness to 
enact hostile norms.  
Finally, one of the recurring dynamics highlighted by the ESIM is that inter-group 
contexts tend to become more hostile when powerful outgroups impose their 
understanding of the inter-group context in ways that are subjectively illegitimate to the 
ingroup. Thus, when police treat (hitherto peaceful) protesters as potentially violent 
offenders, it produces a redefinition of ‘who we are’ and ‘what we are doing’ in ways that 
are more likely to promote inter-group hostility (Drury & Reicher, 2000). On the other 
hand, shifts away from inter-group hostility are facilitated by a sense of legitimacy in 
relations with outgroups, groups that have power to shape social reality (e.g. police, 
regulatory authorities). The effectiveness of any demobilising strategy (such as those 
identified below) is thus contingent upon the extent to which powerful outgroups work to 
develop legitimacy in social relations. More generally, awareness of the inter-group 
dynamics that frame those within the group is central to efforts to combat the 
development of inter-group hostility.  Having described these caveats, let us now turn to 
our core recommendations.  
Pressure Towards Consensus  
The social comparison approach (Festinger, 1950), outlines two major sources of 
pressures toward uniformity of opinions or attitudes within the group: Social reality and 
group locomotion. Group locomotion pressure occurs when uniformity of opinion is 
desirable for a group so they can move towards a common goal. The principle of social 
reality pressure assumes that there must be a basis for the validity of beliefs. If a fact 
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cannot be checked as valid from physical reality, it must be checked by reference to 
whether other people share the opinion that the fact is valid.  This is known as subjective 
validity and is achieved through social validation processes. Within groups, such social 
validation is intimately bound up with the formation of group norms. When consensus 
breaks down, this process of validation no longer operates smoothly, meaning that 
support for the movement will falter.  
Message 1: Break down consensus, encourage dissent.  According to Prentice and 
Miller (1993), if “consensus (or the appearance of consensus) breaks down, the norm 
loses its influence”, (Prentice & Miller, 1993; p. 244; see also Asch, 1952). It follows that 
if there is no perception of consensus or pressure towards uniformity, group behaviour 
may remain or become more moderate.  The easiest and most effective intervention 
would be to break down this impression of uniformity in order to prevent adherence to 
extreme group norms. Of course, according to SCT, in any group there will be some 
pressure towards conformity, and a concomitant assumption that group members think 
and feel the same way about relevant issues and outgroups. This phenomenon is likely to 
be more accentuated among extreme groups (Baray, Postmes, & Jetten, 2009).  At the 
same time, even the most ideologically homogeneous groups are characterized by a rich 
diversity of viewpoints and perspectives which, when exposed, would pose serious 
difficulty for ingroup members’ assumptions of homogeneity. Any dissenters should 
therefore be encouraged and given a platform for their views, and care should be taken to 
maximise the number of spokespersons of the movement. 
The recipe for turning groups away from hostility, therefore, is to conquer them 
by dividing them. This remedy is not unlike Janis’ (1982) cure for groupthink. However, 
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the purpose is not to undermine the need of the group to seek consensus, but rather to 
undermine the perception that it exists. This should weaken the movement by making it 
insecure in its normative expectations. However, the dilution of norms is unlikely to be 
enough. The only long-term way in which to subvert the enaction of these hostile norms 
would be to reformulate them towards a more peaceful orientation.   
Message 2: Question the moral legitimacy of hostility by exposing it.  Although 
intergroup hostility is not uncommon, it is hardly as prevalent as is often assumed. 
Certainly, the dominant mode is for groups to live peacefully and harmoniously, and to 
desire peace and harmony as end outcomes. Where hostility does occur, it is striking that 
its defendants typically justify the ends which the violence they preach is meant to 
secure, implicitly underlining the immorality of the violence itself. This, however, is an 
insecure basis for action, and is always open for debate: How great is the immorality of 
the harms contemplated relative to the gains achieved? Raising this debate, and adding 
weight to the immoral end of the scale, is therefore an effective tool to combat hostility. 
It follows that those who wish to steer the group away from hostility, whether 
internal to the group or outside of it, should unceasingly expose the immorality of 
hostility and question those willing to perpetrate it. Perhaps the most effective way of 
doing this is by exposing it in detail for all to see (although subjectively illegitimate 
behaviour on behalf of the outgroup may exacerbate such efforts). the role of third-party 
outside observers and of insiders with the capacity to act as moral judges (clerics, law 
enforcers, etc.) is crucial in this respect. If they are seen to condone hostility, important 
barriers to it are removed. If they remain steadfast in declaring it immoral and resisting it, 
its chances of success are greatly reduced. 
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Message 3: Erode the foundations of group formation. The most powerful way of 
thwarting a social movement is to question its very existence. Many successful social 
movements have a very narrow basis in terms of numbers. Their continuity depends on 
the response they get, and the degree of acknowledgement this response implies. The 
point may be illustrated by the Western response to the security threat posed by Al 
Qaeda. Although many in the intelligence agencies apparently questioned whether this 
organization existed as a stable entity prior to 9/11, the decision to wage war against them 
has solidified their leadership of the extremist Islamists and validated it from the 
perspective of their passive supporters. Far from weakening them, the violent prosecution 
of them and their power base has strengthened the movement, and possibly brought it 
into existence.  
A more effective treatment would be to individualize all acts of inter-group 
hostility as stemming from a variety of perspectives and viewpoints (and certainly as 
evidence of individual maladjustment and irresponsible behaviour, too), and to refuse to 
treat perpetrators as members of a larger organization. The object would be to question 
the validity of the social category underlying such actions. Removing the recognisable 
group basis of terrorist groups may also be effective in demobilizing passive supporters 
of terrorism, who would no longer have a concrete group with which to identify. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have sought to explore the ways that the dynamic, iterative 
process of identity formation can shape human social behaviour to produce prosocial and 
hostile social movements. We have placed particular emphasis on the importance of norm 
formation and consensualization in the development of social identities which have at 
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their core “nice” and “nasty” forms of normative actions. We argued that small-group 
interaction gives us a special, methodological, “window” into these processes. Let us 
briefly review the key arguments put forward here, before describing what we see as the 
two next steps for people seeking to understand the formation of prosocial and hostile 
social movements.  
We began by outlining a framework for understanding these processes, based on 
the recent work of Postmes and colleagues. The interactive model of identity formation 
provides one account of how social identities can be formed through an inductive, 
bottom-up, process of communication, negotiation and consensualization around norms 
for action. Consistent with this approach, we briefly outlined the work of Reicher and 
colleagues, who have shown the ways that leaders can rhetorically shape group members’ 
responses, by strategically representing normative forms of action. We used this review 
to provide a framework for understanding the ways that group-level helping and hostility 
can be created through argument and dialogue about who “we” are.  
We then moved on to consider concurrent research which has explored the role of 
the opinion-based group interaction method (OBGIM) in promoting commitment to 
positive social change. We suggested that this method, with its focus on interaction and 
consensualization provides one way of understanding commitment to positive social 
movements. We went on to outline the existing OBGIM research which provides some 
insight into the factors that might facilitate the formation of positive social movements, 
and those that may undermine them. Our key focus was on the critical importance of 
providing potential supporters of change with a means for establishing consensual 
understandings in relation to productive norms for action, emotion and beliefs.  
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We then considered the implications of intra-group processes for understanding 
more sinister forms of social behaviour; namely, inter-group hostility and oppression. 
Building off the research of Smith and Postmes, we explored the ways that 
consensualization and normative pressures could be used to subvert the formation of 
hostile social movements. In particular, we argued that to the extent that consensual 
understandings are undermined in these groups, there will be no clear, prescriptive guide 
for negative social actions. Where breaking down consensus is a less viable option, we 
also suggested that encouraging nuanced group norms for debate, and peaceful norms for 
action, might also usefully challenge the negative valence of the group action.  
Overall then, we have sought to build on the framework offered by the social 
identity perspective, by exploring the ways that intra-group processes of debate and 
identity construction critically influence the nature and content of the identity. Drawing 
on the account of identity formation put forward by the interactive model of identity 
formation, we argued that group interaction is not just a tool of social influence (as 
traditional SCT research suggests; e.g. Turner 1991); it is also a tool of identity 
formation. While SCT traditionally posits a top-down process of social influence deriving 
from an individual’s self-definition as a group member, the IMIF makes the point that a 
shared sense of “us” can be constructed in bottom-up ways from the attributes of 
individuals. We have also emphasized the fluid, iterative and dynamic nature of this 
process (following the work of Drury, Reicher and colleagues). Underpinning all of this 
is the importance of understanding which groups, and which identity concerns, underpin 
action. Put another way: if these social actions are the expression of the meaningful 
collective, what is it that defines those collectives? 
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Here, we suggest that the opinion-based group concept may have a particularly 
important role to play. Note that the opinion-based group concept is distinct from the 
methodology mentioned above; opinion-based groups attempt to provide some means of 
understanding, and describing, the groups that participate in collective forms of protest 
(Bliuc et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2009), while the method mentioned above provides a 
means of crystallizing identification with such groups. McGarty et al. (2009) have argued 
that, particularly for social issues where membership of the group cannot be reduced to 
any other sociological, institutional, religious or political affiliation (e.g. pro-life, anti-
war), opinion-based groups can usefully describe the collective basis for group formation. 
It was also argued that opinion-based groups provide prescriptive normative content, 
which can provide a useful guide for social action. 
One further implication is that if opinion-based groups facilitate the formation of 
prosocial social movements because of the clear norms for social action, then deploying 
more ambiguous social categories (those where there are less clear norms for action) may 
be a useful way to subvert hostile social movements. By deploying social categories 
about which there is debate around the central meaning of the identity (e.g. nationhood; 
“All Australians are against immigrants”) may provide one further way to undermine 
consensual understandings of the group. Further discussion about the nature, and 
meaning, of identities involved in positive and negative forms of action would further 
contribute to our understanding of these social behaviours.  
Finally, we wonder about the utility of considering constructions of ingroup 
morality in the formation of prosocial and hostile groups. In hostile group formation, one 
of the key problems in undermining the formation of such groups is that its members 
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derive positive value, and self-worth, from the group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Leach, 
Ellemers and Barretto (2007) have recently argued that ingroup morality is an important, 
but hitherto under-explored, dimension upon which groups gain positive distinctiveness. 
It may be that by specifically attending to the development of group morality may 
provide an additional piece of the picture for those seeking to bolster commitment to 
prosocial movements; or undermine hostile ones.  
We began this paper by arguing that the full practical benefits of the social 
identity approach will fail to be recognized while there is a gap in knowledge about the 
processes that underpin the formation of social movement identities.  In this paper we 
advocated a focus on the intra-group processes by which group members negotiate 
identity content as one means of understanding the development of prosocial and hostile 
social movement participation. In doing so we sought to advance theoretical 
understandings of social identity processes, but also provide a practical means for 
practitioners to “trial” their social change interventions (where small group interaction 
acts as a Petri dish, or microcosm, of everyday social interaction). And most importantly, 
by understanding the processes underpinning development of identities, we may be better 
placed to inform on the enhancement of potentially prosocial social movements (and 
community social consciousness) and the challenging of those defined by intergroup 
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